The Emergence of the Drive Concept and the Collapse of the Animal/Human Divide by Katsafanas, Paul
	   1	  
The emergence of the drive concept and the collapse of the animal/human divide 
 
 
Paul Katsafanas 
 
Boston University 
 
 
Forthcoming in Peter Adamson and G. Fay Edwards (eds.),  
Oxford Philosophical Concepts: Animals 
 
 
 
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, philosophers including Kant 
and Hegel draw a sharp distinction between the human and the animal.  The human is self-
conscious, the animal is not; the human has moral worth, the animal does not.  By the mid 
to late nineteenth century, these claims are widely rejected.  As scientific and philosophical 
work on the cognitive and motivational capacities of animals increases in sophistication, 
many philosophers become suspicious of the idea that there is any divide between human 
beings and other animals.  As Ludwig Büchner puts it in his 1855 bestseller Force and Matter, 
“the plant passes imperceptibly into the animal, the animal into man.”1  In this paper, I’ll 
trace these transitions in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century thought about animals.   
My focal point will be the notion of drive or instinct (Trieb, Instinkt). The term Trieb, 
and its cognate Instinkt, originally refers to any physical, biological, or psychological force 
that initiates motion.  Thus, when it originates in the thirteenth century, the term Trieb can 
be used equally well to pick out the forces driving a herd of animals over a hill or the energy 
needed to begin the turning of a windmill.  Although initially restricted to non-human 
animals and physical processes, by the sixteenth century drive is applied to forces that 
operate in human beings: Leibniz, for example, refers to the “flames of the divine will which 
give us a drive [Trieb] to do good.”2  
Although in sporadic usage during these centuries, the drive concept explodes in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: it begins playing central roles in three distinct areas: 
embryology, ethology, and metaphysics.  In embryology, drive describes a force, inaccessible 
in itself but whose results are visible and susceptible to scientific and philosophical study, 
governing organic development.  In ethology, drives are the sources of seemingly deliberate, 
highly articulated, yet non-conscious activities, which are directed at ends of which the 
animal is ignorant.  In metaphysics, drive describes the human essence.  
Clearly, the concept Trieb has a tangled history: it’s initially astonishing that a single 
concept would play a role in each of these debates.  It becomes still more surprising when 
we see how these debates influenced one another. 
Sections One through Three treat these three areas of thought in turn.  I focus on 
the way in which the emergence of the drive concept in each of these three domains 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Ludwig Büchner, Force and Matter: Empirico-Philosophical Studies, Intelligibly Rendered, trans. J. Frederick 
Collingwood (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1855/2012), 85.   
 2 On these points, I’ve drawn on Madeleine Vermorel, “The Drive [Trieb] from Goethe to Freud,” International 
Review of Psycho-Analysis 17 (1990): 249-56. 
 
	   2	  
undermines the idea that there is any sharp distinction between the human and the animal. 
Section Four considers how, in light the collapse of the human/animal divide, ethical 
theories are reshaped. 
 
1.  Embryology and the Bildungstr i eb  
 
 During the eighteenth century, a number of scientists, philosophers, and theologians 
engaged in a spirited debate over fetal development.  The puzzle is this: animal fetuses seem 
to start out as largely undifferentiated masses which, in the course of development, gradually 
become ever more articulated.  At the earliest stages we see merely a clump of cells; a bit 
later, limbs seem to develop; later, still, we see the traces of organs; until, at birth, the 
organism, in all its complexity, is present.   
There are two ways in which this development might take place.  First, the earliest 
stages of the fetus might lack various parts: the fetus might be an originally undifferentiated 
mass that is gradually articulated into organs and other parts.  This option is termed epigenesis.  
Second, the earliest stages of the fetus might already contain, in miniature, all the organs and 
differentiation of the adult organism.  We may not be able to see the organs, limbs, etc., but 
they are there.  Gestation would then involve nothing more than growth.  This option is 
called preformationism.  
Although we now know that the first possibility, epigenesis, is the correct one, 
thinkers of the time hotly debated the two possibilities.  They deployed not only empirical 
observations but also theological and philosophical considerations.  After all, one can see 
why epigensis looks mysterious and engenders philosophical puzzles.  How could a formless 
mass differentiate itself into a system of mutually interacting organs and tissues?   
Attempts to answer this question with the resources of eighteenth and nineteenth 
century science were far from convincing.  For example, in Theoria generationis (1759), Caspar 
Friedrich Wolff argued in favor of epigenesis by positing a vis essentialis, an essential force, 
that drove the process.  But this looks circular: it seems that he is simply stating that 
differentiation occurs because there is some unknown force that drives differentiation.  The 
alternative possibility, that all the interacting and mutually dependent parts are already 
present in miniature, seemed to many a more sensible hypothesis. 
 This debate raged on for generations.  What will be significant for us is one moment 
in this debate: Johann Friedrich Blumenbach’s (1752-1840) publication of Über den 
Bildungstrieb in 1781.  This tract defends a version of epigenesis.  In particular, Blumenbach 
draws on empirical observations to defend the following conclusion: 
 
There exists in all living creatures, from men to maggots and from cedar trees to 
mold, a particular inborn, life-long active drive. This drive initially bestows on 
creatures their form, and then preserves it, and, if they become injured, where 
possible restores their form.  This is a drive […] that is completely different from the 
other special forces of organized bodies in particular.  It shows itself to be one of the 
first causes of all generation, nutrition, and reproduction. […] I give it the name of 
Bildungstrieb (Nisus formativus).3 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 3 Über den Bildungstrieb, pp. 12-13; translation quoted from Robert Richards, The Romantic Conception of Life 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 218-9. 
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Blumenbach is positing a force that drives not just embryo development, but the 
maintenance of animal form in general.  For Blumenbach, paradigmatic instances of this 
self-maintenance include the hydra’s ability to regenerate parts of its body and the human 
body’s ability to heal wounds.  The idea, here, is that animals have an observable tendency to 
generate and re-generate their bodies according to some “form”, or blueprint of the animal.   
Blumenbach calls this force the Bildungstrieb.  It is a force that operates on originally 
undifferentiated material, endowing it with a form, and is likewise at home in developed 
animals, preserving and maintaining their forms.  Note the connotations of the term: it is a 
Trieb, a force, and it is a force of Bildung—that notorious German word that can mean 
development or formation or education or cultivation.  (I’ll note below that the resonances 
of this word will be important in the Bildungstrieb’s reception by Goethe and others.) 
 Blumenbach is careful to emphasize the epistemic status of the Bildungstrieb.  He 
claims that is a force whose cause is unknown but whose effects are perceptible.  He models it on 
Newtonian accounts of gravity: we can see that there is a force at work in the universe, we 
can name it “gravity,” and we can specify its effects, but we (at the time) cannot say what 
causes this force to be manifest.  Just so, Blumenbach suggests, with the Bildungstrieb: 
 
I hope it will be superfluous to remind most readers that the word Bildungstrieb, like 
the words attraction, gravity, etc., should serve, no more and no less, to signify a 
power whose constant effect is recognized from experience and whose cause, like 
the causes of the aforementioned and commonly recognized powers, is for us an 
occult quality.  What Ovid said pertains to all of these forces—the cause is hidden, 
the force is well recognized.4  
 
In sum, Blumenbach postulates a force, known by its effects, that gives rise to 
differentiation, development, and maintenance of form.   
 It is of tremendous consequence for philosophy that Kant was impressed by 
Blumenbach’s work.  He sends Blumenbach a letter praising his “excellent work on the 
Bildungstrieb,” saying that through it he has seen how “you unite two principles—the physical-
mechanical and the sheerly teleological mode of explanation of organized nature.  These are 
modes which one would not have thought capable of being united.”5 Kant’s thought is that 
nature must be understood mechanistically, but that biology demands teleological 
explanations.  Kant interprets Blumenbach’s Bildungstrieb as a way of reconciling this conflict: 
we see that there is some causal principle at work in nature, a principle that generates what 
look to us like teleologically structured biological phenomena.  We assume that these telic 
phenomena have some mechanistic ground; but we cannot understand what that ground is. 
Thus, we use the Bildungstrieb as a regulative ideal.  In other words, Kant suggests that we 
conduct biological explanations by positing, as a regulative idea, purposes in nature.  (This 
differs from the way that Blumenbach himself sees the Bildungstrieb; he treats it as a real force 
in nature, not simply a regulative ideal.) 
From Kant, the concept makes its way into the philosophical lexicon.  Two features 
come to be emphasized.  The first is the general idea that there are observable psychological 
or biological forces whose causes are unknown.  The second is that there is some way of 
bridging the apparent divide between efficient causes and final causes.  This second point 
seizes the philosophical imagination: we soon find philosophers who go beyond these points 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Über den Bildungstrieb, 2nd edition, pp. 25-26; quoted from Richards, The Romantic Conception of Life, 226. 
5 Immanuel Kant to Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (5 August 1790), in Immanuel Kant, Briefwechsel. 
	   4	  
about efficient and final causes, claiming, more radically, that the drive concept unites 
necessity and freedom.  Witness Schelling, who writes, “for this unification of freedom and 
lawfulness we have no other concept than the concept of a drive.”6  But that is to step 
ahead; let me dwell, for a moment, on another strand in the emergence of the drive concept.  
 
 
2.  Accounts of animal and human behavior 
 
2.1 The traditional view 
  
 A separate debate, though again occupying a central role in philosophical, scientific, 
and theological thought: what happens when a non-human animal acts?  In the eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries, it is common for philosophers and other thinkers to draw a 
sharp distinction between free, rational human activity and necessitated, mechanistic animal 
behavior.    
According to his picture, human beings are capable of determining their actions via 
episodes of reflective, self-conscious choice.  Motives do not determine these choices: we 
have the capacity to survey our motives, check them, and decide, freely and rationally, which 
ones to act upon.  This is how we differ from the other, less cognitively sophisticated 
animals: while “the brutes,” as philosophers used to call them, are directly actuated by 
stimuli, self-conscious creatures can rise above their motives, reflect on them, and decide 
which ones to act upon.   
This is a model of agency with a very long history: we can see traces of it in Plato’s 
claim that reason can exert a controlling influence on appetite and spirit (Republic); in 
Augustine’s attempt to locate moral responsibility in the will (De Libero Arbitrio); and in 
Aquinas’ claim that human beings have a capacity for “rational judgment”, which enables 
them to reflect upon and determine their own judgments, whereas the other animals merely 
have “natural judgment,” which is determined by external factors (De Veritate 24.2).  But it 
culminates, perhaps, in Kant, who tells us that the will “can indeed be affected but not 
determined by impulses... Freedom of choice is this independence from being determined by 
sensible impulses” (Metaphysics of Morals 6:213-214). Elsewhere, Kant writes that the will is “a 
faculty of determining oneself from oneself, independently of necessitation by sensible 
impulses” (Critique of Pure Reason A 534/B 562), and that “an incentive [or desire] can 
determine the will to its action only insofar as the individual has taken it up into his maxim” (Religion 
within the Boundaries of Mere Reason 6:24).  In other words, self-conscious agents are capable of 
standing back from the workings of desire and choosing in a way that is not determined by 
any of them.7 
The brutes, by contrast, are actuated in a far simpler fashion. The mechanists, 
following Descartes, argue that we can understand the animal as a purely mechanical system: 
animal actions are simply mechanical responses to predetermined stimuli.8   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Schelling, On the World Soul (1798), 6:216. 
7 This, at any rate, is the way that Kant is usually interpreted.  For discussion, see Paul Katsafanas, “Nietzsche 
and Kant on the Will: Two Models of Reflective Agency,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (July 2014): 
185-216. 
8 [[[ INSERT REFERENCE TO DESCARTES PAPER ]]] 
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Now a very large number of the motions occurring inside us do not depend on any 
way upon the mind.  These include heartbeat, digestion, nutrition, respiration when 
we are asleep, and also such waking actions as walking, singing, and the like, when 
these occur without the mind attending to them. When people take a fall and stick 
out their hands so as to protect their head, it is not reason that instructs them to do 
this; it is simply that the sign of the impending fall reaches the brain and sends the 
animal spirits into the nerves in the manner necessary to produce this movement 
even without any mental volition, just as it would be produced in a machine. And 
since our own experience reliably informs us that this is so, why should we be so 
amazed that the light reflected from the body of the wolf on to the eyes of a sheep 
should be equally capable of arousing the movements of flight in the sheep? […] all 
actions of the brutes resemble only those which occur in us without any assistance 
from the mind.9 
 
In this passage, Descartes starts by noting that many human actions, such as the beating of a 
heart or one’s hands flying in front of one’s face as one stumbles, are explicable as mere 
mechanisms that involve no mental activity whatsoever.  In the final lines, he suggests that 
all animal actions fall into this camp.  And again in the Treatise on Man, Descartes writes that, 
in the animal, functions such as sense perception, “internal movements of the appetites and 
passions, and finally the external movements of all the limbs […] follow from the mere 
arrangement of the machine’s organs every bit as naturally as the movement of a clock or 
other automaton follow from the arrangement of its counter-weights and wheels.”10  
This Cartesian picture enables a sharp divide between human and animal actions: our 
actions are genuinely goal directed, and are—or can be—products of self-conscious thought.  
But the brutes are different: their actions are explicable in terms of efficient causation alone; 
moreover, they experience no genuine thought, no genuine emotion.  What appears, in 
them, to be goal direction is exactly analogous to what happens in the clock: mechanical 
processes involving nothing more than efficient causation yield fixed behavior with lawlike 
regularity. 
Elements of the Cartesian theory are controversial, with many thinkers claiming that 
animals experience feelings and emotions.  For example, Hume claims that animals 
experience sophisticated emotions such as sympathy (Treatise 2.2.12), and Kant allows that 
animals have a “faculty of desire” and experience pleasure and displeasure (Metaphysics of 
Morals 6:211).  But the general picture according to which there are two classes of 
behavior—animal behavior and human behavior, necessitated behavior and free activity, 
behavior understood in terms of efficient causation alone and behavior understood in terms 
of final causes—has a long and distinguished history. 
 It’s easy to see why we’d be tempted in this direction.  Attributing genuine goal 
direction and conscious thought to the bird or the fish seems unnecessary in order to 
account for their behavior.  Moreover, it’s difficult to imagine that the bird or the fish 
reflectively surveys its actions and decides which one to perform.  So, if there are only two 
choices—fully reflective rational deliberation or blind mechanism—we slot the animal 
actions into the mechanistic camp.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 9  René Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 3 volumes, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, 
and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985): Volume 2, 161. 
10 Philosophical Writings of Descartes, volume 1, 108.  
	   6	  
In the nineteenth century, this tendency dissipates.  It becomes increasingly common 
to claim that there is no essential difference between human and animal activity.  Thus, in 
the Descent of Man, Darwin writes,  
 
If no organic being except man had possessed any mental power, or if his powers 
had been of a wholly different nature from those of the lower animals, then we 
should never have been able to convince ourselves that our high faculties had been 
gradually developed. But it can be clearly shown that there is no fundamental 
difference of this kind.  We must admit that there is a much wider interval in mental 
powers between on the lowest fishes, as a lamprey or a lancet, and one of the higher 
apes, than between an ape and man; yet this immense interval is filled with 
numberless gradations.11  
 
How do we get from Descartes’ sharp distinction to Darwin gradations?  At least part of the 
path is that made available by the drive concept. 
 
2.2 Introduction of a third category of behavior 
 
If there were only two options—if action had to be either purely mechanistic or fully 
free and self-conscious—then we’d be tempted to put animal activity in the former camp 
and human activity in the latter.  But something interesting happens in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries.  Ethologists introduce a third, intermediary category of behavior, the 
instinctive.  This is something that is neither purely mechanical, because it involves 
thought/sensation and direction toward some definite end, nor purely conscious, because it 
is performed without awareness of its ultimate end.  Once this third category is introduced, it 
is seen that it is present in humans; and then the human/animal divide begins to look less 
sharp.  Let me explain. 
Studies of animal behavior in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries begin to call 
the traditional picture into question.  Set aside simple and immediate cases of action, such as 
the dog snarling at its enemy or the cat drinking milk.  Consider, instead, extended episodes 
of behavior.  What comes to fascinate thinkers of this time is that animals perform some 
highly complex behaviors that are directed not only at proximate goals, but also at distal 
goals; moreover, they often perform these complex behaviors without seeming to have 
learned how to do so.  Simple examples include the spider weaving its web and the 
caterpillar producing its cocoon.  What’s common to all of these cases is a complex, 
unlearned system of behavior directed at an end.  Crucially, knowledge of the action’s end 
does not appear to be necessary.  Let me give just one example: Henry Lord Brougham 
discusses a species of solitary wasp that gathers grubs and stores them beside its eggs, then 
departs before the eggs hatch.  The grubs serve as food for the larvae that will hatch from 
the eggs, but the wasp cannot possibly know this.  For “this wasp never saw an egg produce 
a worm [i.e., a larva] – nor ever saw a worm – nay, is to be dead long before the worm can 
be in existence – and moreover she never has in any way tasted or used these grubs, or used 
the hole she made, except for the prospective benefit of the unknown worm she will never 
see.”12   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 11 Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man (London: Penguin, 1871/2004), Chapter II. 
12 Henry Lord Brougham, Dissertations on Subjects of Science concerned with Natural Theology (1839), I:17-18.   
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These are the sorts of actions that occupy center stage in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century discussions of ethology.  A term is introduced.  Call instinctive actions 
those behaviors that are complex, directed at a distal goal, and done without learning.  As 
Charles Darwin writes, 
 
An action, which we ourselves require experience to enable us to perform, when 
performed by an animal, more especially by a very young one, without experience, 
and when performed by many individuals in the same way, without their knowing for 
what purpose it is performed, is usually said to be instinctive.13  
 
How are we to account for instinctive activity, so described?  A common view is that 
we cannot reduce instinctive activity to mechanistic activity, nor can we treat it as conscious 
activity.  We need a third, intermediary category.  Thus, in an 1885 issue of the Fortnightly 
Review, the prominent English biologist St. George Mivart14 heaps effusive praise on 
Schelling’s “affirmation that the phenomena of instinct are some of the most important of 
all phenomena, and capable of serving as a very touchstone whereby the value of competing 
theories of the universe may ultimately be tested.”15 For, the author claims, “the real 
existence of such a thing as ‘instinct’ must necessarily be fatal” to mechanistic explanations 
of the universe.  Mivart allows that reflex actions, such as respiration and digestion, are 
explicable purely mechanically (323-5).  Instinctive actions, though, “hold a middle place 
between (1) those which are rational, or truly intelligent, and (2) those in which sensation has 
no place” (325). They are due “neither due to mechanical or chemical causes, nor to 
intelligence, experience, or will” (326). 
I think we can see well enough why mechanistic explanations of instinct seem 
problematic: it’s hard to envision what the mechanistic processes driving complex, 
temporally extended, goal directed courses of activity would be.  It’s also easy to see why 
instinctive activities can’t be treated as fully conscious activities: while we might say that 
these actions involve awareness of certain proximate goals, the organism has no awareness 
of the distal goal that is served by these proximate ones.  The wasp may know that it is 
collecting grubs and so on; but it cannot know that it is storing these grubs near its eggs so 
that the larvae that it will never see will have a nourishing meal.  Moreover, the entire stretch 
of activity is unlearned, yet performed perfectly the first time it is done.  Conscious direction 
can’t be required here. 
 So what form of awareness and sensation is thought to be present in these instinctive 
actions? The idea is that instincts involve motivation via sensation or feeling: 
 
Instinct is a certain felt internal stimulus to definite actions which has its foundation 
in a certain sense of want, but is not a definite feeling of want of the particular end to 
be attained. Were that recognized, it would not be instinct, but desire.16  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 13 Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species (New York: Modern Library, 1859/1993), 317-8. 
14 St. George Mivart (1827-1900) attempted to reconcile natural selection with the teachings of the Catholic 
Church.  He was in regular contact with the leading figures of the period, including Huxley and Darwin, both 
of whom responded to his critiques at length in their published works. 
15 St. George Mivart, “Organic Nature’s Riddle” (Fortnightly Review 44 (1885): 323-337), 323. 
16 St. George Mivart, “Organic Nature’s Riddle”, 326. 
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The animal desire some series of proximate ends without seeing how attainment of these 
ends serves a distal goal.  Consider two examples.  Williams James writes, 
 
We may conclude that, to the animal which obeys it, every impulse and every step of 
every instinct shines with its own sufficient light… What voluptuous thrill may not 
shake a fly, when she at last discovers the one particular leaf, or carrion, or bit of 
dung, that out of all the world can stimulate her ovipositor to its discharge? Does not 
the discharge seem to her the only fitting thing? And need she care or know anything 
about the future maggot and its food?17 
 
Or, to choose an earlier and quite influential example: Georg Heinrich Schneider, in Der 
Thierische Wille (1880), writes, “it might easily appear” that the cuckoo “acted with full 
consciousness of the purpose” when it laid its eggs in another bird’s nest.  But no: “the 
cuckoo is simply excited by the perception of quite determinate sorts of nest, which already 
contain eggs, to drop her own into them, and throw the others out, because this perception 
is a direct stimulus to these acts.  It is impossible that she should have any notion of the 
other bird coming and sitting on her egg.”18 The fly experiences a voluptuous thrill in the 
presence of a bit of dung; the cuckoo is excited by the perception of a certain kind of nest.  
These creatures do not know why they are excited or attracted to certain courses of action; 
but we, the external observers, can see that their attraction to these actions serves some 
distant goal. 
 
2.3 Degrees of sensation and thought 
  
 But can we be more precise about the types of awareness, affect, and sensation that 
are present in instinctive actions?  Early thinkers tend to equate instinctive activity with 
blind, unthinking movement.  Take Thomas Reid: instinct is “a natural blind impulse to 
certain actions, without having any end in view; without any deliberation and often without 
any conception of what they do.”19  But this belief fades.  One interesting facet of these 
debates is that a consensus gradually emerges that instinctive activities involve cognition and 
affect.  Condillac (1714-80) and Erasmus Darwin (1731-1802) endorse this position, arguing 
that animal and human behavior involved some form of reason and sensation.  But the 
position emerges most clearly in two thinkers who are initially unaware of one another’s’ 
work: Schneider and Herbert Spencer. 
Schneider, whose Thierische Wille I mentioned above, argues that drive-motivated 
actions involve some awareness and are performed under the pressure of some feeling or 
urge; his discussion of the cuckoo’s urge to lay eggs in certain nests is meant as an example 
of this.  His book offers a sustained defense of this idea.  He proceeds by surveying a wide 
range of animal actions and offering a systematization of them.  For example, he classifies 
feelings as produced in one of four ways: they are dependent on and activated by either 
sensation, perception, ideas (i.e., representations of one’s sensations or perceptions), or 
judgments.  Impulses or motives can be classified in an analogous fourfold category 
(Theirische Wille, Chapter 4).  Using these distinctions, Schneider argues that instinctive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 17 William James, The Principles of Psychology (New York: Dover, 1890), Volume II, 387-8. 
18 Quoted from James, Principles of Psychology, Volume II, 389.  
19 Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1788/1969), Chapter 
II. 
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activities always involve feeling, and sometimes involve memory, ideas, and conscious 
purposes.  Humans and animals differ only in what their feelings are sparked by: in the 
simplest animals, feelings are simply caused mechanistically, without any mental antecedents; 
in somewhat more complex animals, perceptual states can lead to motivation; in more 
complex ones, ‘ideas’ or representations of perceptions can motivate; and in still more 
complex ones, including perhaps only the humans, thoughts can engender motivations.  So 
the Cartesian view that we have either pure mechanism or fully fledged rational thought is 
rejected: all instinctive actions involve genuinely mental phenomena, though the types of 
mental phenomena involved do differ across species of animal and types of action.   
Herbert Spencer defends an analogous account. Spencer argues that instincts in 
“inferior creatures” are automatic, in the sense that Reid and others describe.  However, this 
automatism ceases to be blind in more complex creatures.20  He writes, 
 
In its higher forms, Instinct is probably accompanied by a rudimentary 
consciousness. There cannot be co-ordination of many stimuli without some 
ganglion through which they are all brought into relation. … The implication is that 
as fast as Instinct is developed, some kind of consciousness becomes nascent.21  
 
His claim is that complex instincts involves the coordination of a range of factors, and this 
requires consciousness: 
 
Further, the instinctive actions are more removed from the actions of simple bodily 
life in this, that they answer to external phenomena which are more complex and 
more special. While the purely physical processes going on throughout the organism 
respond to those most general relations common to the environment as a whole; 
while the simple reflex actions respond to some of the general relations common to 
the individual objects it contains; these compound reflex actions which we class as 
instincts, respond to those more involved relations which characterize certain orders 
of objects and actions as distinguished from others. Greater differentiation of the 
psychical life from the physical life is thus shown in several ways—in the growing 
distinction between the action of the vegetative and animal systems; in the increasing 
seriality of the changes in the animal system; in the consequent rise of incipient 
consciousness ; and in the higher speciality of the outer relations to which inner 
relations are adjusted: which last is indeed the essence of the advance, to which the 
others are necessary accompaniments.22 
 
When he claims that purely physical actions respond to the “most general” relations, Spencer 
has in mind tropisms, such as the plant’s turning toward the sun.  Reflex actions respond to 
somewhat less general relations: Spencer mentions polyps that withdraw or contract when 
they receive any tactile sensation.23  He then asks us to consider polyps that withdraw to 
different degrees when a different tactile or visual sensation occurs; and then motile aquatic 
organisms, which respond in more complex ways to different visual and tactile sensations.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 20 Herbert Spencer, The Principles of Psychology, Second Edition (London: Williams and Norgate, 1870), Section 
170. 
21 Spencer, Principles of Psychology, Section 195. 
22 Spencer, Principles of Psychology, Section 195. 
23 Spencer, Principles of Psychology, Section 196. 
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Spencer interprets these instincts as responsive to less general, more particular occurrences.  
Crudely put, the polyp responds to all movements in the same way; the fish responds 
differently to movements of different types, movements in different directions, movements 
of different speeds, and so on.24  As the organism becomes responsive to more particular 
and complex characteristics, Spencer reasons, it will need increasing sophisticated forms of 
consciousness.   
There are two reasons why increasing complexity puts increasing demands upon 
consciousness.  First, the organism will need some way of processing an increasing number 
of variables.  Consider the difference between a simple physiological process such as 
contracting in the same way when any tactile stimulation occurs and more complex 
processes that require tracking and coordinating data from distinct sensory modalities.  
Second, as the characteristics tracked by instinctive actions become more complex, Spencer 
argues that the connection between the characteristics and the actions will loosen: 
 
If, as the instincts rise higher and higher, they come to include psychical changes that 
are less and less coherent with their fundamental ones; there must arrive a time when 
the co-ordination is no longer perfectly regular. If these compound reflex actions, as 
they grow more compound, also become less decided; it follows that they will 
eventually become comparatively undecided. They will begin to lose their distinctly 
automatic character. That which we call Instinct will merge into something higher.25 
 
His idea is something like this: if instinctive action A arises from a conjunction of stimuli B, 
C, D, E, F, G, then these stimuli will occur together less frequently, and when they do occur 
they may be mixed with stimuli that initiate alternative actions.  Thus, action A will follow 
less directly from the presence of the stimuli; the action will become less automatic. When 
the instinctive action becomes highly complex, rational action arises: “rational action arises 
out of instinctive action when this grows too complex to be perfectly automatic.”26 The 
complex sets of stimuli no longer pick out just one action.  So some further factor is needed 
to determine the animal’s action.  In these cases, memory and reason will be deployed: an 
executive faculty will be play a role in determining which action is performed, and it will base 
its decisions in part on accumulated past experiences.  Thus,  
 
That progressive complication of the instincts, which, as we have found, involves a 
progressive diminution of their purely automatic character, likewise involves a 
simultaneous commencement of Memory and Reason.27 
 
Though the details need not detain us, we can see that Spencer is making several 
claims.  First, there is a continuum from purely physical/mechanical processes to reflexes to 
instincts to rational action.  Second, as we progress across this continuum, the complexity of 
the stimuli increases, and with it the demands placed upon cognition and memory; so, too, as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 “The movement produced in a creature having a rudimentary eye, when an opaque object is suddenly passed 
before that eye, is more general and more simple than is the movement produced in a creature which grasps the 
prey passing before it. In the first case the effect is produced whatever the relative position of the object, 
providing the obscuration be considerable; in the second case it is produced only when the object is just in 
front” (Principles of Psychology, Section 197). 
25 Spencer, Principles of Psychology, Section 198. 
26 Spencer, Principles of Psychology, Section 205. 
27 Spencer, Principles of Psychology, Section 203. 
	   11	  
we progress across this spectrum, the connection between the occurrence of the stimuli and 
the performance of the action weakens. What looked like a sharp divide between the 
mechanistically explicable, fully determinate actions of animals and the reflective, reasoned 
actions of human beings has collapsed.  As Spencer puts it, “the commonly-assumed hiatus 
between Reason and Instinct has no existence…the highest forms of psychical activity arise 
little by little out of the lowest, and cannot be definitely separated from them.”28   
In sum, thinkers including Spencer and Schneider put a great deal of pressure on the 
metaphysical and psychological distinctions between human and animal. 29   To be sure, 
some thinkers do try to preserve the old regime, treating instinctive actions as explicable in 
purely mechanistic terms and human actions as involving something more. However, the 
dominant view has shifted.  As Büchner puts it, “the animal also possesses an ego and self-
consciousness; but nobody is inclined to consider this consciousness as something absolute 
or divine.”30 What was, in Kant’s day, good common sense has fallen into disrepute. 
 
2.4  Drives and the obscurity of human action 
 
 So, to summarize: the venerable dichotomy between necessitated, mechanistic animal 
behavior and free, conscious human behavior is complicated by the introduction of a third, 
apparently intermediary category: instinctive behavior.  Instinctive actions share features with 
each of the others: like mechanical actions, they do not involve conscious direction; like 
conscious actions, they involve some awareness, sensation, and thought.  
 These debates on drives are interesting in their own right, for they begin to collapse 
the human/animal distinction as well as the self-conscious/non-self-conscious distinction.  
In addition, they bring to the fore a neglected possibility for human action: for humans and 
animals alike, there can be highly complex behavior that requires affective and cognitive 
monitoring of unfolding patterns of activity, yet does not require that the agent be aware of 
the end toward which this behavior is directed.  This is different from the stock examples of, 
e.g., submerged selfishness in that have occupied philosophers since antiquity. It’s easy to see 
how human behavior might present itself as selfless while actually being selfish.  It’s harder 
to imagine the agent’s many particular goals as subserving some larger end of which he is 
ignorant.  But this is just the possibility for which thinkers of the time emphatically argue.  
Schneider, for example, argues that every case of human action is instinctive, in the sense 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Spencer, Principles of Psychology, Section 203. 
29 See also Wundt: “The attempts to define the relation of man and animals from a psychological point of view 
vary between two extremes. One of these is the predominating view of the old psychology that the higher 
"faculties of mind", especially "reason", are entirely wanting in animals, or that, as Descartes held, animals are 
mere reflex mechanisms without mind. The other is the wide-spread opinion of representatives of special 
animal psychology, that animals are essentially equal to man in all respects, in ability to consider, to judge, to 
draw conclusions, in moral feelings, etc. With the rejection of faculty-psychology the first of these views 
becomes untenable. The second rests on the tendency prevalent in popular psychology to interpret all objective 
phenomena in terms of human thought, especially in terms of logical reflection. The closer analysis of so-called 
manifestations of intelligence among animals shows, however, that they are in all cases fully explicable as 
simple sensible recognitions and associations, and that they lack the characteristics belonging to concepts 
proper and to logical operations. But associative processes pass without a break into apperceptive, and the 
beginnings of the latter, that is, simple acts of active attention and choice, appear without any doubt in the case 
of higher animals, so that the difference is after all more one of the degree and complexity of the psychical 
processes than a difference in kind” (William Wundt, Outlines of Psychology, trans. Charles Hubbard Judd. 
London: Williams & Norgate/G.E. Strechert & Co., 1896/1907). 30	  Büchner, Force and Matter, Preface to Third Edition.  	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that instincts prompt us to act without representing the ultimate goal of our action.  In 
particular, Schneider claims that the one end common to every human action is preservation 
of the species.  However, we rarely represent this goal within consciousness.   
Schopenhauer makes a similar point, arguing that drives operate by generating 
illusions or delusions that tempt the agent to pursue their ends.  Schopenhauer thinks that 
sexual love is among the strongest and most pervasive of our drives: “It is the ultimate goal 
of almost all human effort.”31  However, Schopenhauer claims that we misunderstand the 
nature of this drive.  The drive that is responsible for our experience of love does not aim at 
love, but rather at sexual or reproductive activity. As he puts it, “the true end of the whole 
love-story, though the parties concerned are unaware of it, is that this particular child may be 
begotten.”32 Of course, we do not experience love as geared solely toward reproduction.  
Indeed, many individuals who are in love, and who engage in sexual activity, desire not to 
reproduce.  As Schopenhauer puts it, these individuals “abhor… and would to prevent the 
end, procreation, which alone guides” the drive.33 Schopenhauer explains that the drive 
operates by occluding its aim: 
 
the sexual impulse, though in itself a subjective need, knows how to assume very 
skillfully the mask of objective admiration, and thus to deceive consciousness; for 
nature requires this stratagem in order to attain her ends.34   
 
In other words, the reproductive drive disguises its true aim. “However objective and touched 
with the sublime that admiration may appear to be,”35 what is really aimed at is reproduction.  
This is a general feature of drives: they operate by structuring the organism’s thought, 
emotion, and perception, so that the organism is motivated to pursue the drive’s aim, all the 
while failing to see exactly what that aim is.  In short, “Here, then, as in the case of all drive, 
truth assumes the form of a delusion, in order to act on the will.”36 
 Just as many animals are aware of proximate goals without seeing that they serve 
distal goals, so too with human beings.  And this leads us into another area in which the 
drive concept upsets traditional debates.  Below, I’ll consider the way in which the drive 
concept disrupts the idea that consciousness is an essential aspect of human nature.  If 
something like Schopenhauer’s view is right, we have grounds for thinking that 
consciousness is not our essential nature; and thus, that the thing which seemed to mark us 
off most clearly from other animals is, in fact, less important than we thought.  Indeed, we 
shortly find thinkers—including Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Hartmann—arguing that 
rather than being our essence, consciousness is something that corrupts us, that brings us 
further from our animal nature.  
 
3.  Metaphysical claims about human and animal essence 
  
 In embryology, the drive is the life force, the mysterious but observable force 
powering organic development and self-maintenance; in ethology, the drive is the source of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 31 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, 2 volumes, trans. E.F.J. Payne. (New York: Dover 
Publications, 1818 and 1844/1969), Volume II, 533. Hereafter WWR. 
32 Schopenhauer, WWR, Volume II, 535. 
33 Schopenhauer, WWR, Volume II, 540. 
34 Schopenhauer, WWR, Volume II, 535. 
35 Schopenhauer, WWR, Volume II, 535. 
36 Schopenhauer, WWR, Volume II, 540. 
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instinctive action, action that is directed toward goals the organism may never know, action 
that arises from teleologically organized patterns of affect and sensation.  These ideas are 
philosophically redolent, and it is not long before they are explored and extended. 
 The emergence of the drive concept allows us to see animal and human action as 
different in degree rather than kind: animals, too, are directed toward ends, experience 
sensations and feelings, and, more generally, differ from mere mechanisms like clocks and 
bells.  But just as the animal is thereby being brought closer to the human, the human is 
being brought closer to the animal.  For another, closely related debate centers on animal 
and human essence.   
 
3.1 Traditional views of the human essence 
Consider, again, a traditional view: the essence of the human being is consciousness 
or conscious activity.  Descartes, who claims that there cannot “be any thought in us of 
which…we are not conscious,” argues that conscious thinking is our “whole essence or 
nature.”37  Analogously, Locke claims that consciousness determines our identity: 
“consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes every one to be 
what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other things.”38 Others go still 
further.  Kant treats consciousness not only as an essential attribute of human beings, but 
also as conferring a special status on us: 
 
The fact that the human being can have the ‘I’ in his representations [i.e., is self-
conscious] raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth.  Because of this 
he is a person […] i.e., through rank and dignity an entirely different being from things, 
such as irrational animals, with which one can do as one likes.39 
 
And Hegel gives consciousness a still grander role: 
 
The whole history of the world […] seems to have reached its goal, when this 
absolute self-consciousness, which it had the work of representing, ceased to be 
alien, and when spirit accordingly is realized as spirit.40 
 
World history reaches its apogee with the emergence of self-conscious creatures who self-
consciously recognize the nature of self-consciousness.  And, in many of these thinkers, this 
metaphysical distinction underwrites a moral distinction: 
 
Beings the existence of which rests not on our will but on nature, if they are 
beings without reason, have only a relative worth, as means, and are therefore called 
things, whereas rational beings are called persons because their nature already marks 
them out as an end in itself, that is, as something that may not be used merely as a 
means…41 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37  Descartes, Fourth Replies, AT VII 246; Discourse on Method, AT 33. 
38 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1689/1975), Section 
II.xxvii.9. 
39 Kant, Anthropology, 127. 
40 G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 3 volumes, trans. E.S. Haldane (Lincoln, Nebraska: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1821-31/1985), Volume 3, 551-2. 
41  Kant, Groundwork, 4:428. 
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Animals, lacking self-consciousness, are distinct from us, and this distinction makes a moral 
difference: animals can be treated as mere means.  But can this distinction be maintained? 
 
3.2 Drive as our essence 
 
With the emergence of the drive concept, thinkers begin denying that self-
consciousness is our essential nature.  I’ll focus on Fichte and Schiller.  These thinkers treat 
drive as a simple, essential force as giving rise to all human activity and as the locus of our 
essential self.  Understanding drives is the key to understanding human nature and living 
authentically.   
By the turn of the nineteenth century, Trieb has begun to refer to an internal force 
that organizes mental and physical processes.  It is something that is inaccessible to us: as 
Blumenbach emphasized, we can see the effects, but not the cause.  This idea is taken 
further by Fichte, who at once associates the drive with our true self and simultaneously 
questions whether this self is comprehensible: 
 
My nature is drive. How is it even possible to comprehend a drive as such?  That is 
to say, what mediates such an act of thinking of a drive in beings such as we are, 
beings who think only discursively and by means of mediation?42  
 
The drive is our inmost nature, but how can it be thought?  Fichte’s concern is not just, with 
Blumenbach, that we can see the effects but haven’t yet discovered the cause.  His worry is 
deeper: 
 
The kind of thinking that is at issue here can be made very clear by contrasting it 
with the opposite kind of thinking. Anything that lies in a series of causes and effects 
is something I can easily comprehend in accordance with the law of the mechanism 
of nature. Every member of such a series has its activity communicated to it by 
another member outside itself, and it directs its activity to a third member outside 
itself. In such a series a quantum of force is simply transferred from one member to 
the next and proceeds, as it were, through the entire series.  One never learns where 
this force comes from, since one is forced to ascend further with every member of 
the series and never arrives at an original force. The activity and the passivity of each 
member in this series is thought by means of this force that runs through the [entire] 
series. – A drive cannot be comprehended in this manner, and thus it cannot by any 
means be thought of as a member of such a series. If one assumes that some external 
cause acts on the substrate of the drive, then there would also arise an efficacious 
action, directed to some third thing, lying outside [this substrate, that is, lying outside 
the I]. Or if the cause in question does not have any power over the substrate of the 
drive, then nothing at all would come about. A drive, therefore, is something that 
neither comes from outside nor is directed outside; it is an inner force of the 
substrate, directed upon itself. The concept by means of which the drive can be 
thought is the concept of self-determination.43 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42  Johann Gottlieb Fichte, System of Ethics, trans. Daniel Breazeale and Günter Zöller (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 106. 
43 Fichte, System of Ethics, 106-7. 
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So a drive is a force, whose origins cannot be understood by positing further causes.   A 
drive cannot be thought through the concept of cause and effect; it demands to be thought 
of as freedom or self-determination.  It is sheer activity, inexplicable in causal terms.  And 
this activity is also my essential nature: 
 
My nature, therefore, insofar as it is supposed to consist in a drive, is thought of as 
determining itself through itself, for this is the only way that a drive can be 
comprehended. From the viewpoint of the ordinary understanding, however, the 
very existence of a drive is nothing more than a fact of consciousness, and ordinary 
understanding does not extend beyond the facts of consciousness. Only the 
transcendental philosopher goes beyond this fact, and he does so in order to specify 
the ground on this fact.44  
 
Drives are the most basic or fundamental sources of activity.  As Fichte puts it in another 
passage, “The being of the I is absolute activity and nothing but activity; but activity, taken 
objectively, is drive.”45  
 Drive is pure activity or freedom.  But the philosophical work on drives does not 
end there: many of the early Romantics associate drives with Bildung—that is, with self-
formation or self-cultivation.  I’ll focus on Schiller.  
Schiller’s model of human agency begins by accepting the Kantian distinction 
between reason and sensibility. In Schiller’s terminology, we are moved by two apparently 
opposed drives: the sense drive and the form drive.  The sense drive  
 
issues from the physical existence of man, or from sensuous nature; and it is this 
drive which tends to enclose him in the limits of time, and to make of him a material 
being […] This drive extends its domains over the entire sphere of the finite in man, 
and as form is only revealed in matter […]It binds down to the world of sense by 
indestructible ties the spirit that tends higher, and it calls back to the limits of the 
present, abstraction which had its free development in the sphere of the infinite. No 
doubt, thought can escape it for a moment, and a firm will victoriously resist its 
exigencies: but soon compressed nature resumes her rights to give an imperious 
reality to our existence, to give it contents, substance, knowledge, and an aim for our 
activity.46  
 
The sense drive disposes us toward the physical, the sensory, the particular, and the limited.  
The form drive, by contrast, arises 
 
from [human beings’] rational nature, and tends to set free, and bring harmony into 
the diversity of its manifestations, and to maintain personality notwithstanding all the 
changes of state.47  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Fichte, System of Ethics, 107. 
45 Fichte, System of Ethics, 101. 
 46 Friedrich Schiller, Letters on the Aesethetic Education of Man, in Aesthetic and Philosophical Essays, edited by Nathan 
Dole (Boston: F.A. Niccolls & Co, 1795/1902), Letter XII.  
47 Schiller, Letters on the Aesethetic Education of Man, Letter XII. 
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It is concerned with the universal and timeless, and thus “it suppresses time and change. It 
wishes the real to be necessary and eternal, and it wishes the eternal and the necessary to be 
real; in other terms, it tends to truth and justice. If the sensuous instinct only produces 
accidents, the formal instinct gives laws, laws for every judgment when it is a question of 
knowledge, laws for every will when it is a question of action.”48  
 Setting aside many complexities, we can say that the form drive motivates the 
rational appreciation of universals, whereas the sense drive motivates the engagement with 
particulars.  These drives jointly constitute our essence: they are the most fundamental 
sources of human activity.  And it appears to be an essence in conflict with itself, riven by 
two opposed drives: as Schiller puts it, “one [drive] having for its object change, the other 
immutability, and yet it is these two notions that exhaust the notion of humanity, and a third 
fundamental impulsion, holding a medium between them, is quite inconceivable. How then 
shall we re-establish the unity of human nature, a unity that appears completely destroyed by 
this primitive and radical opposition?”49  
His answer is Bildung: we seek a form of sublimation, which is to be achieved 
through culture. Suppose the drives could be combined in a harmonious project, each 
enjoying its full expression through the other:  
 
We have been brought to the idea of such a correlation between the two drives that 
the action of the one establishes and limits at the same time the action of the other, 
and that each of them, taken in isolation, does arrive at its highest manifestation just 
because the other is active. […] But if there were cases in which he could have at 
once this twofold experience in which he would have the consciousness of his 
freedom and the feeling of his existence together, in which he would simultaneously 
feel as matter and know himself as spirit, in such cases, and in such only, would he 
have a complete intuition of his humanity, and the object that would procure him 
this intuition would be a symbol of his accomplished destiny and consequently serve 
to express the infinite to him—since this destination can only be fulfilled in the 
fulness of time. Presuming that cases of this kind could present themselves in 
experience, they would awake in him a new drive, which, precisely because the other 
two drives would co-operate in it, would be opposed to each of them taken in 
isolation, and might, with good grounds, be taken for a new drive.50 
 
The individual can aspire to perform actions that combine the highest manifestations of the 
two drives: each drive feels itself at once redirected and given fullest expression by the other.  
And, by doing so, the agent would be creating or awakening a new drive, the play drive: 
“The sensuous drive wishes to be determined, it wishes to receive an object; the formal drive 
wishes to determine itself, it wishes to produce an object. Therefore the drive of play 
[Spieltrieb] will endeavor to receive as it would itself have produced, and to produce as it 
aspires to receive.”51 Though Schiller’s reflections on play are at once nuanced and obscure, 
the core idea is easily articulated: in free play, we combine spontaneous conformity to rules 
or laws with sensuous engagement with particulars.  We are constrained, but see this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Schiller, Letters on the Aesethetic Education of Man, Letter XII. 
49 Schiller, Letters on the Aesethetic Education of Man, Letter XIII. 
50 Schiller, Letters on the Aesethetic Education of Man, Letter XIV. 
51 Schiller, Letters on the Aesethetic Education of Man, Letter XIV. 
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constraint as wholly self-imposed.  We have, in Schiller’s nice description, both grace and 
dignity (Anmut und Würde).  
 But how is this union between the drives to be attained?  Through culture: 
 
The office of culture is to watch over them [the sense and form drives] and to secure 
to each one its proper limits; therefore culture has to give equal justice to both, and 
to defend not only the rational drive against the sensuous, but also the latter against 
the former. Hence she has to act a twofold part: first, to protect sense against the 
attacks of freedom; secondly, to secure personality against the power of sensations. 
One of these ends is attained by the cultivation of the sensuous, the other by that of 
reason.52  
 
The conflict of the drives motivates sublimation, which is attained through culture.  If this 
sublimation could be attained, we would enjoy an authentic experience of ourselves, having a 
“complete intuition of [our] humanity.” Understanding and redirecting the drives becomes 
the key to fully expressing human nature. 
 
4. Drives and ethics 
 
 The drive concept, as it emerges from discussions of embryology and ethology, and 
as it is complicated by Fichte and the Romantics, becomes oddly multivalent.  Consider the 
meanings that the term has acquired in the course of two centuries.  In its humble 
beginnings, drive is simply the energy producing some mechanical effect, as in windmills.  
Not so by the end of the nineteenth century.  We have, first, the idea that there is a force, 
whose causes are unknown, that manifests itself by driving differentiation and development 
of organic forms.  Second, there are highly complex purposive activities that proceed 
without conscious direction, but involve some form of thought or sensation; these are 
described in terms of drives.  Moreover, we have the idea that there may be a singular source 
of all activity.  Not only that: drive may be inaccessible to us, articulable only in confused or 
distorting forms.  For the drive is sheer activity, which cannot be grasped in familiar causal 
terms.  Nonetheless, the drive is our essence.  And not just ours: these tendencies are taken 
to pervade all life.  The forces driving us, the forces shaping our essence, are at work 
throughout the organic kingdom.  Thus, Goethe, having read Blumenbach, begins using the 
term Bildungstrieb in the mid 1780s.  In Goethe, the Bildungstrieb is a source of all organic 
activity, but is especially manifest in creative activity; it is inaccessible to or distorted by 
reflection.  The drive, as a source of active development, pervades nature, from its depths to 
its heights.   
 We’ve seen numerous ways in which the introduction of the drive concept collapses 
traditional distinctions between the human and the animal.  Before closing, I want to turn, 
briefly, to the way in which the undermining of psychological and metaphysical distinctions 
between the human and the animal leads, in some thinkers, to a reassessment of ethical 
theories. 
First, the idea that animals are fundamentally different than us leads us to think that 
we can treat them as we see fit.  Contrasting Kant and Schopenhauer is a good way of seeing 
how, once the human/animal divide is abandoned, ethics is rethought. Kant claims that 
animals “will have no general cognition through reflection, no identity of the 	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representations, also no connections of the representations according to subject and 
predicate, according to ground and consequence, according to the whole and according to 
the parts; for these are all consequences of the consciousness which animals lack.”53 In short, 
animals lack self-consciousness.  Kant takes this to entail that we can have no duties to 
animals: 
 
As far as reason alone can judge, a human being has duties only to human beings 
(himself and others), since his duty to any subject is moral constraint by that 
subject’s will[…] A human being can therefore have no duty to any beings other than 
human beings.54 
 
Schopenhauer agrees with Kant that human beings alone enjoy self-consciousness 
(or, as Schopenhauer puts it, human beings alone have Reason). However, we share a 
common essence with other living creatures.  Our essential nature is not consciousness, but 
instead will: “Consciousness is conditioned by the intellect, and the intellect is a mere accidens 
[accidental property] of our being.”55 He continues, “in all animal beings the will is the 
primary and substantial thing; the intellect, on the other hand, is something secondary and 
additional.”56 But what is the will?  It is simply striving, directed at nothing in particular: 
“The will, considered purely in itself, is devoid of knowledge, and is only a blind, irresistible 
urge.”57 The will manifests itself in particular drives, such as the sex drive.  This is common 
to both humans and animals.  Our essential nature is shared.   
Given our shared essential nature, Schopenhauer argues that there are no sharp 
ethical distinctions between treatment of animals and treatment of other human beings.  In 
On the Basis of Morality (1840), Schopenhauer strongly condemns Kant for his claim that 
animals need not be treated as ends: “ ‘there are no duties toward animals’, is, frankly, a 
revolting crudity and barbarism of the West […] it rests on the assumption, despite all 
evidence to the contrary, of the radical difference between man and beast.”58 Schopenhauer 
traces this Kantian view to Christian assumptions about the humanity’s dominion over 
animals:  
 
Christian morals has no regard for animals, so in philosophical morals animals are at 
once fair game, just ‘things’, just means to favored ends, thus something for 
vivisection, for deer-stalking, bullfighting, horse-races, whipping to death as they 
struggle with heavy quarry carts, etc.—Shame on such a morality […] which fails to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Kant, Lectures on Metaphysics, Ak 28:276. 
 54 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 6:442. Although we have no duties to animals, Kant allows that we have duties 
regarding animals. For example, Kant claims that we have a duty not to be cruel to animals.  He reasons that 
cruelty toward animals undermines sympathy and love, and this can lead us to violate our duties to human 
beings.  So we should avoid cruelty to animals not because it is bad for them, but because it is bad for us.  As 
Schopenhauer describes Kant’s view: “one should have compassion with animals just for practice” (Arthur 
Schopenhauer, The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics, trans. E. Cartwright and E.E. Erdmann [Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1840/2010], 173). Although this is the traditional way of reading Kant on animals, Kain (this 
volume) provides a novel argument that Kant requires us to have certain moral emotions directed toward 
animals (e.g., that we must be sympathetic toward animals, and not just, as Schopenhauer puts it, for practice).   
55 Schopenhauer, WWR, Vol. II, 201. 
56 Schopenhauer, WWR, Vol. II, 205. 
57 Schopenhauer, WWR, Vol. II, 275. 
58 Schopenhauer, Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics, 239. 
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recognize the eternal essence which exists in every living being and shines forth with 
inscrutable significance from all eyes that see the sun!59 
 
Schopenhauer recommends that we alleviate suffering in man and animal alike. He 
argues that “he who is cruel to animals cannot be a good man,”60 and writes, “I know of no 
more beautiful prayer than that with which ancient Indian dramas ended [...] It was: ‘May all 
living beings be delivered from suffering!’”61  
Schopenhauer does recognize some reasons for prioritizing humans: 
 
goodness of heart consists in the deeply felt, universal compassion for all living beings, 
and especially for man; because responsiveness to suffering keeps in step with 
increase in intelligence; hence, the countless intellectual and physical sufferings of 
human beings have a much stronger claim to compassion than the pain of animals, 
which is only physical, and thus less acute.62 
 
Human beings are, supposedly, more susceptible to pain, and hence more in need of 
compassion.  But this is a matter of degree.    
 So the first point is that if humans and animals have a shared nature, the default 
ethical assumption shifts: rather than starting with the idea that different ethical demands 
will apply to humans and animals, we see the ethical claims as applying to both in the same 
way.  There is also a second and more complex point, which I can only sketch here: for Kant 
and other proponents of the idea that self-consciousness is humanity’s essential feature, it’s 
tempting to think that at an ethic governing human beings should focus on the operations of 
self-conscious thought.  But if something like Schopenhauer’s view is correct—if our 
essential nature is drive, and if these drives direct us at ends of which we are largely 
ignorant—then it will seem superficial to focus on conscious phenomena.  These conscious 
phenomena are seen as the product of something deeper, the drives.  Thus, in thinkers 
including Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, ethical theorizing shifts: to put it in the broadest 
possible way, these thinkers are interested in which configurations of the human mind—
including drives, affects, and the social conditions interacting with them—are conducive to 
flourishing.  In neither of these thinkers is flourishing to be achieved principally through 
conscious activity.  Self-consciousness, far from being something distinctive and exalted, 
comes to play a subsidiary role. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
I’ve sketched the development of the drive concept and traced the consequences of 
its introduction.  Originally denoting nothing more than the energies needed to initiate 
mechanical processes, by the middle of the nineteenth century “drive” can pick out anything 
from a mysterious but visible force responsible for organic development, to a source of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Schopenhauer, Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics, 173. 
60 Schopenhauer, Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics, 242. 
61 Schopenhauer, Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics, 237.  Schopenhauer repeatedly emphasizes the superiority 
of Hindu over Christian thought on animals: in a typical line, he writes that it is “a fitting symbol of the defect 
of Christian morals […] that John the Baptist appears quite like a Hindu Sannyasi, but at the same time—is 
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animals, see Carpenter (this volume). 
62 Schopenhauer, Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics, 253. 
	   20	  
purposive activity, to a concept of pure activity.  Each of these notions put pressure on the 
human/animal divide.  Freed of the impoverished dichotomy between self-conscious 
intelligence and mere mechanism, thinkers envision a spectrum of less to more complex 
mental processes.  And, introducing the idea that our deepest aims are concealed from us, 
our place seems less secure.  We are not alone in thoughtful behavior; we are not alone in 
sensation, affect, and intelligence; and we do not enjoy any privileged knowledge of our 
ultimate goals.  As Büchner writes, “The best authorities in physiology are now pretty much 
agreed in the view that the soul of animals does not differ in quality but merely in quantity 
from that of man.”63,64  
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64 I am grateful to an audience at King’s College London for extremely helpful comments on this material. 
	   21	  
References 
 
Augustine. De Libero Arbitrio/ On the Free Choice of the Will, trans. Thomas Williams. 
Indianapolis, Illinois: Hackett, 387-395/1993. 
Büchner, Ludwig. Kraft und Stoff: Empirisch-naturphilosophische Studien; in allgemein-verständlicher 
Darstellung. Force and Matter: Empirico-Philosophical Studies, Intelligibly Rendered, trans. J. 
Frederick Collingwood. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1855/2012.   
Darwin, Charles. On the Origin of Species. New York: Modern Library, 1859/1993. 
Darwin, Charles. The Descent of Man. London: Penguin, 1871/2004. 
Descartes, René. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 3 volumes, trans. John Cottingham, 
Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1985. 
Feuerbach, Ludwig. The Essence of Christianity, trans. George Eliot. New York: Prometheus 
Books, 1841/1989.  
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb. Das System der Sittenlehre nach den Principien der Wissenschaftslehre (1798). 
System of Ethics, trans. Daniel Breazeale and Günter Zöller. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005. 
Frierson, Patrick. “Kant’s Empirical Account of Human Action,” Philosophers’ Imprint 5:7 
(2005): 1-34. 
Hegel, G.W.F. Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1807/1977. 
Hegel, G.W.F. Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. H. B. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1821/1991. 
Hegel, G.W.F. Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 3 volumes, trans. E.S. Haldane.  Lincoln, 
Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1821-31/1985. 
Huxley, T. H. “On the Hypothesis that Animals are Automata, and its History,” Fortnightly 
Review 95 (1874): 555–80. 
James, William. The Principles of Psychology. New York: Dover, 1890. 
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason, Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (eds.). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1781 and 1787/1998. 
Kant, Immanuel . Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Mary Gregor (ed.). New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1785/1998. 
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason, Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (eds.). New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1788/1999. 
Kant, Immanuel. Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Allen Wood and George di 
Giovanni (eds.). New York: Cambridge University Press, 1793/1999. 
Kant, Immanuel. The Metaphysics of Morals, Mary Gregor (ed.). New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1797/1996.  
Katsafanas, Paul. “Nietzsche and Kant on the Will: Two Models of Reflective Agency,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 89 (July 2014): 185-216. 
Lange, F.A. The History of Materialism and Criticism of its Present Importance, trans. E. Thomas. 
New York: The Humanities Press, 1865-75/1950. 
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhem. New Essays on Human Understanding, ed. Peter Remnant and 
Jonathan Bennett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1704/1996. 
Leibniz, G.W., and S. Clark. G.W. Leibniz and Samuel Clark: Correspondence, Roger Ariew (ed.). 
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2000. 
Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1689/1975. 
	   22	  
Lowry, Richard. The Evolution of Psychological Theory. Hawthorne, New York: Aldine 
Publishing, 1971.   
St. Mivart, George. “Organic Nature’s Riddle,” Fortnightly Review 44 (1885): 323-337. 
Reid, Thomas. Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1788/1969. 
Richards, Robert. Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1987. 
Richards, Robert. The Romantic Conception of Life. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002. 
Rosenfield, Lenora. From Beast-Machine to Man-Machine: Animal Soul in French Letters from 
Descartes to La Mettrie. New York: Columbia University Press, 1968. 
Schopenhauer, Arthur. The World as Will and Representation, 2 volumes, trans. E.F.J. Payne. 
New York: Dover Publications, 1818 and 1844/1969. 
Schopenhauer, Arthur. Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics, trans. E. Cartwright and E.E. 
Erdmann. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1840/2010. 
Schiller, Friedrich. Letters on the Aesethetic Education of Man, in Aesthetic and Philosophical Essays, 
edited by Nathan Dole. Boston: F.A. Niccolls & Co, 1795/1902.  
Spencer, Herbert. The Principles of Psychology, Second Edition. London: Williams and Norgate, 
1870. 
Thorpe, W.H. Learning and Instinct in Animals. London: Methuen and Company, 1956.   
Vermorel, Madeleine. “The Drive [Trieb] from Goethe to Freud,” International Review of Psycho-
Analysis 17 (1990): 249-56. 
Wilm, E.C. The Theories of Instinct. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1925. 
Wundt, Wilhem. Outlines of Psychology, trans. Charles Hubbard Judd. London: Williams & 
Norgate/G.E. Strechert & Co., 1896/1907. 
 
